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Article 2

PAN-AMERICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
I.
The question is often put in rhetorical fashion, sneeringly:
"Is there any such thing as International Law?" If you wish
to be in the company of the vast majority of superficial observers who read the newspapers and nothing else, you will
admit weakly that there does not seem to be any such thing
in the muddled world today. The explanation that you will
be expected to give for the absence of International Law is
the lack of any established political superstate, capable of
enforcing legislation for the conduct of sovereign *states internationally. Implied in your excuse for denying the existence of International Law, is the popular belief current in
this country and inculcated in text-books of law throughout our land, that the chief source of law is the physical
power to enforce the will of a determined government and
that of the courts; and that the sovereignty of national
states is unlimited.
The opposite to such a positivistic interpretation of all
law is sometimes slurringly referred to as the idealistic approach to law, which by its very label would be damned to
the limbo of worthless ideology. Fortunately the metaphysician and legal academician is allowed the "poetic" license of
weaving a theory of law which finds its being in an abstract
authority with priority over organized force. Though it is
not common knowledge, the truth of the matter is that the
philosopher, who honestly and logically probes the ultimate
nature of law, serves society in its most urgent needs of
peace, liberty and prosperity, infinitely better than the selfstyled "realists" who limit all law to rules enforceable here
and now by a national state and its protected subordinate
members.'
1 Cf. Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, Bk. 1, Chap. 1, pp. 90 and
470 et seq.: Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia.
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Especially in a society organized into states with such
strong nationalistic loyalties as people have today will the
truths of a sound philosophy of law, civil and international,
be found to fructify in values incomparably superior to the
Dead Sea apples of international Leagues and world-empires.
When the cynic asks you to explain the potential source
of international law you will find that you are led to investigate the genesis of all law. For the question involves
the claims of two rival concepts of "law": one giving primacy
to "authority," the other to "power."
II.
The positivists argue bluntly that unless subjects of a
state are persuaded by sanctions of one kind or another, the
mandates of governments will not become effectual. The
immediate conclusion which is commonly drawn is that
therefore it is useless to insist upon any ethical theory of
"authority". This is an unwarranted inference, hardly deserving of comment. For when there is so little support given to wise laws that they have become dead letters, it is then
most necessary for an examination of their true worth in the
light of fundamental principles of jurisprudence. Public opinion is then in need of reeducation so that the true values of
law can be inculcated and the popular support of right
minded men may be rallied on the side of regulations wisely
designed for the common good.
The right to use force must arise from some title in justice. Bandits are not essentially supermen. It is sufficient for
the present discussion to point to the disastrous consequences
that follow from the identification of authority with the will
of an organized mob.
That great philosopher, St. Thomas, emphasizes this point,
viz., that competent authority, even though it may not possess the physical power to enforce all of its prescriptions, still
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remains the source of law. "All law proceeds from the reason
and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from
the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of
man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and
will in practical matters may be manifest by speech, so may
they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man
chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it
is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed
and expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of a human reason. Wherefore by actions
also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom,
law can be changed and expounded; and also something can
be established which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will,
and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; for
when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed
from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom
has the force of law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of
law." 2 The customs of a nation and the free customs of nations in their formal relations with one another retain the
essential elements of law, as long as the conditions implied
in the international customs remain the same.
We see that in early societies, sanctions are of a moral
character, emerging from the reverence for the gods, custom,
and public opinion; at times they are arbitrary, springing
from private vengeance or royal will.' The ideal of law
precedes that of sanction. "Law is enforced by the state because it is law; it is not law merely because the state enforces it." I Justinian accepts a similar view regarding sanctions and laws.5
Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, Iae, Q. 97, art. 3.
Cf. Maine's Early History of Inst., lect. II. 30.
4
Cf. Pollock's Jurisprudence, chap. 1. 27.
5 "Sanctae quoque res, veluti muri et portae civitatis, quodammodo divini
juris sunt; et ideo nullius in bonis sunt. Idea autem muros sanctos dicimus, quia
poena capitis constituta est in eos qui aliquid in muros deliquerint. Ideo et legum
eas partes, quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint,
sanctiones vocamus." (Inst. of Just., 11. I, de Rerum Divisione, & c., 10).
2

3
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To define law as any rule of action which will be enforced
by the entrenched power of politicians whose sole title has
been obtained from the people by conquest or political intrigue is to crystallize and glorify a radically unreasonable
principle. Those who occupy the seats of the mighty need to
be reminded constantly that continental "power-politics" of
itself will eventually prove a boomerang to those who rely
thereon. It is true that the disciples of power-politics in
Europe have their prophets who teach that might precedes
right. They can point to Machiavelli, Hegel, Treitschke,
Lasson, Austin, Von Hartmann, and a host of others for confirmation of their belief that an omnipotent party towers
above ethical criticism. On the other hand, the great philosophers of all times, from Aristotle to Orestes Brownson,
(a great political philosopher of American origin) have
proved beyond doubt that the primary requisite for law and
peace is the principle of reasonable plan.
III.
In American Jurisprudence, natural rights are recognized
as prior to the powers or rights that are delegated by the people to the government of the United States. Among the Constitutional powers for the conduct of inter-national relations,
is the right conferred upon-the President and the Senate to
make treaties.
By article 2, section 2, of the Federal Constitution the
"tpower to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by article 6, treaties made under the authority of the United
States, along with the Constitution and the laws of the
United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the
supreme law of the land .... Acts of Congress are the su-

preme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made
under the authority of the United States." Thus spoke Mr.
Justice Holmes in the decision of the Supreme Court, denying the State of Missouri the right to interfere with a fed-
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eral officer acting under authority of a treaty (with Great
Britain) proclaimed by the President, December 8, 1916.6
A treaty is "law" in all essential details. As soon as a treaty
is ratified with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate,
(in the United States) it may be enforced by the sanctions
that are applicable in the case of any other law. Just as
sporadic violations of civil laws do not rob them of their
essential authority, so it is with International Law.7 As long
as laws are commonly observed by the generality of those
who have consented to their restraint in one way or another,
and as long as those who have an interest in their observance see to it that the laws are adhered to by those who remain disdainful of law, the perfection of the law is achieved
by their sanctions. So it is again with the rules of International Law. They remain in force just as long as public opinion and international good-will recognize their value as a
means to the good end of international society, and are willing to sanction them by the effective instrumentality of
force.
To be sure, the imperfection of International Law, lies in
the frequent inadequacy of sanctions to support the law, be
it a treaty, custom, or any other rule. The absence of sanctions is rendered more lamentable by the exercise of arbitrary coercion by interests which can profit by the nullification of reasonable international rules.
IV.
Society and the politico-geographical face of the earth like
ancient Gaul in the time of Julius Caesar is divided by virtue
of several seas into three parts: Asia, Europe, and the Americas. These parts have indeed many interests in common; and
each has other interests which concern but one continent at
any time and place. One or two of these continental units
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
7 Cf. Cunard S. S. Co. v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); De Geofray
v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1889).
6
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may for a considerable period be at war or peace within itself without necessarily breaking down the intra-oceanic
(relative) self-sufficiency of the third section of our globe.
What significance does this picturization of three continental units reveal? On the American continent, looking
from west coast to east coast, one observes that peace for
many years has reigned supreme. Following the example of
the United States, Canada, and Mexico in the Northern
Hemisphere, our South American republics in. their own
sphere manage to settle their most difficult problems without resort to total war. The reverse is true with respect to
the Asiatic and European continental worlds. Neither of
them is at peace within itself. In Asia you have Japan at
war with China; and Japan is hardly at peace with Asiatic
Russia. In Europe you may be sure that the latest truce has
not settled the deepest quarrels which clamor for decision.
Their armed camps are, at a moment's notice, ready to disgorge tons of destructive explosives into enemy territory
with the resultant collapse of their civil societies.
Let one look again at the unit which is North America.
It is no idle self-glorification that inspires the motto which
is inscribed upon the coin of an American dollar: "E pluribus
unum." That ideal might well be contrasted with the mottoes
which epitomize the philosophy of other continental powers,
such as "Deutchland ueber alles," or "Britannia rules the
waves," or "the Mikado is divine." If there be any secret of
North American order and peace, it. is to be found in the
unity which takes vital possession of all the multiple local
parts, causing them to function both separately and organically in dependence upon the reason and will of the whole
nation. This is perfectly clear to any legal student who has
studied the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence, which together articulate the political needs of the New World. Canada, living her own life,
at the same time accepts the leadership of the United States
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as a necessary condition for her own political welfare in the
family of nations. Mexico is likewise more than a neighbor;
in her foreign policy she relies in the main on the protection
of the Northern Colossus whose course in world politics is
mapped out in Washington for the American ship of state
and in some degree for those that follow in her wake.
This chartered course of American statecraft is not so
easily changed as those who are uninitiated in the science
of our particular American Jurisprudence may imagine. Settled as a constitutional issue long ago, and proved to a powerful minority in a civil war three quarters of a century past,
is the plan of local state subordination to the federal organism.
Mr. James Wilson, one of the signers of the Declaration
of Independence and of the original draft of the Constitution, later appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court, leaves
us a detailed analysis of the philosophy of law which is ever
needed for an enduring continental unity and peace. Said
he, for example:
"Whatever object of the government is confined in its operation and
effects within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered
as belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of government extends in its operations or effects beyond the bounds of a
particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of the United States." 8

And again:
"If a difference can be discerned between them, it is in favor of the

federal government; because that government is founded on a representation of the whole union; whereas the government of any particular

state is founded only on the representation of a part, inconsiderable
when compared to the whole. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that
the counsels of the whole will embrace the interest of every part, than
that the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of the whole?" 9

The practical effect of such an understanding of Continental needs has been to entrust the responsibility of coining
8 I Works 533. Ed. by James DeWitt Andrews (1926).
9 I Works 534.
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money, commanding the army, regulating interstate commerce and transportation, and regulating tariffs, to one central government under constitutional rules of law. To one
Supreme Court go all the states of the Union, without brandished weapons of coercion, and all "sovereign" clients, with
claims at times rejected, return home to carry out the rules
of "nine lonely old men."
Herein, is Law that conforms to the juristic ideal: the rule
of reason over physical force. This is the practical use of
"right before might." Fortunate beyond measure is that part
of humanity resident in America where people are governed
by the rule of law and not by the rule of men, whose autocratic will is on the whole a cheap and painful substitute for
reasoned law.
There is no juristic impediment to a further expansion of
the sphere of law that will subtend the entire hemisphere of
the Americas. Clearly, there is no league or superstate which
is qualified to lay down rules for the Americas. It is left for
the established states acting through their governments to
make effective the law which is higher than any 'human
court or society and to make treaties that will have all the
authority and value of law in the international order.

V.
When the United States' Secretary of State and his advisers enter upon the difficult task of collaborating with the
statesmen representing South Americaa republics in formulating new declarations of principle and in drafting a multilateral treaty between several American States, we have good
reason to anticipate a valuable contribution to International
Law. Without benefit of any super-state to dictate the rules
of procedure for inter-American political relations, our nations can under the law of nature and of nature's God establish treaties which will have de jure and de facto all the elements necessary for Public International Law.
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It is the natural duty of the people and government of the
United States to cooperate with all other nations in positive
action reasonably calculated to promote peace and order in
world affairs. In the western hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine has the force of custom and it is reasonable for the
North and South American states to incorporate their common interpretation of this American doctrine into the concrete terms of a treaty. There is danger indeed that a treaty
such as that contemplated by several in the recent Conference, might overstep the bounds which justice to European
and Asiatic people requires. Dollar diplomacy and American imperialism must not be permitted to spoil the work
of far-sighted statesmen engaged in this pioneering enterprise. Their efforts must be seconded by the Senate of the
United States upon whom much of the responsibility for the
constitution of our just treaties depend. Public opinion, in
the last analysis, will judge whether or not this latest adventure in international cooperation will be more reasonable
in relation to its social and juristic purposes than some of the
projects which in the past have ended in alliances and "associations" leading to war.
Public International Law, like civil law, is capable of
growth and development, as well as decline. One generation
may often witness the eclipse of old law and the establishment of new law and new customs that grow out of new conditions in the world. The opportunity is at hand for the
Americas to give to Europe and Asia a Christian example of
Pan-American International Law.
William F. Roemer.
University of Notre Dame.

